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    CPSA Students Caucus Meeting

    Congrès annuel de l'ACSP 2019 - 4 juin 2019
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    Workshop: The Official Languages Act at 50
    Le 50e anniversaire de la Loi sur les langues officielles

    Congrès annuel de l'ACSP 2019 - 4 juin 2019
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    Reception: Department of Political Science
    University of British Columbia

    Congrès annuel de l'ACSP 2019 - 4 juin 2019
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    Association canadienne de science politique
    Programme du congrès annuel de l'ACSP 2019


    Organisé à l'Université de la Colombie-Britannique
    Mardi le 4 juin 2019 au jeudi 6 juin 2019
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    Discours présidentiel
    François Rocher, CPSA President

    Vie et mort d’un enjeu
    la science politique canadienne
    et la politique québécoise

    Location: CIRS 1250
    Mardi le 4 juin 2019 | 17 h 00 - 18 h 00
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    Keynote: UBCIC Grand
    Chief Stewart Phillip

    Asserting Indigenous
    Title and Rights in 2019

    Location: CIRS 1250
    Mardi le 4 juin 2019 | 10 h 30 - 12 h 00
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    Keynote Speaker: Wendy Brown
    In the Ruins of Neoliberalism:
    Our Predicaments:
    the Rise of Anti-democratic
    Politics in the West

    Location: CIRS 1250
    Mercredi le 5 juin 2019 | 14 h 00 - 15 h 30
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    Keynote Speaker: Roland Paris
    Canada Alone?
    Surviving in a Meaner World

    Location: CIRS 1250
    Jeudi le 6 juin 2019 | 10 h 30 - 12 h 00

ACSP/AÉI-Canada, section sur les relations internationales

C10(b) - Brexit and the Future of European Cooperation

Date: Jun 5 | Heure: 10:30am to 12:00pm | Location: SWING 407

Chair/Président/Présidente : Marc Froese (Burman University)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Marc Froese (Burman University)

Euroscepticism and Sharp Power as Instruments of Foreign Policy: Sharon Pardo (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
Abstract: This paper advances three arguments about Euroscepticism and 'Sharp Power.' First, using Israel as a case study I describe its alliances with Eurosceptic political actors, claiming that while each side hopes to benefit from these alliances to advance particular interests, the attraction among the actors is based on ideological affinities that do not align with the norms informing EU policies. If these norms become more contested, it may make it more difficult to construct a ‘normative power’ based approach in EU foreign policy. Second, I reveal how third parties can use Euroscepticism and Sharp Power as instruments for shaping EU foreign policy. Finally, I expose how this strategy produces a political paradox. By allowing itself to become an instrument deployed by a third party, the Eurosceptic EU member state also agrees to be pushed back into the fold of the EU apparatus, thus reconstituting itself as an internal actor, one which has stakes in the process and is willing to play by the rules of the game.

Managing Risks, IO Enlargement and Bilateral Cooperation: Understanding How American Security and German Economic Commitments Affected NATO and EU Enlargement: Anessa Kimball (Université Laval)
Abstract: IO enlargement involves risky investments in future members under incomplete information. Like lender profiles of borrowers as low, moderate, or high risk, IO’s face similar decisions about future allies. Sandler (2000) shows for club goods a logic of lowest common denominator emerges, where weak states effectively reduce the quality of the collective good to their individual level. Such disturbances in a good’s provision are attenuated when an IO provides diverse goods, but if it produces a single good such reductions may be problematic. Those heavily invested in the IO should offset the perceived economic and security risks of particular future allies using bilateral means, side-payments. NATO & EU enlargement after 1990 provides a set of states to study the relationship between a state’s risk profile, bilateral (security/economic) investment, and IO membership. A four-part risk profile measures a state’s potential to increase the IO’s defense from threat and contribute to collective security (for NATO), as well as its economic capacity and democratic character (for the EU). Bilateral investment diminished uncertainty/risk resulting in less time until accession. A quantitative model of alliance accession, based solely on the risk factors, is compared to one accounting for the effect of the number bilateral American security and German economic investments.


European Citizenship and Free Movement after Brexit: Willem Maas (Glendon College, York University)
Abstract: Free movement of persons has been central to the European project since its genesis, undergirds the single market, and is the key element of EU citizenship, to which some have attributed federalizing aims and the European court has suggested is “destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States”. The right to live, work, and study anywhere within the EU usually tops public opinion surveys asking Europeans what the EU means to them, and these rights are enormously popular across the EU, even in the UK. Whichever form Brexit takes—hard, soft, simply symbolic, or something else—it is clear that free movement is a significant issue in the process. This paper examines the effects of the Brexit negotiations and potential post-Brexit scenarios on EU citizenship and free movement. The UK has been a key impediment to a more fully developed EU citizenship, but ‘nationalist’ or protectionist tendencies are also present elsewhere. For example, the UK was joined by Germany, Austria and the Netherlands in 2013 in attempting to convince the Commission to place limits on potential ‘benefit tourism’ but the Brexit negotiations and other developments are leading to calls for a more social Europe, including more support for free movement within Europe.